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KNOX V. SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION:
BALANCING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT WITH FAIRNESS
UNDER UNION-SHOP
AGREEMENTS
DONATA MARCANTONIO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your employer, without notice, garnished your wages
to pay for a political campaign that you did not support. What if, when
you voiced your objection, your employer told you there was nothing
you could do about it because the political cause was desperate for
funding?
Many Americans would immediately recognize this scenario as an
infringement of their First Amendment rights. The First Amendment’s
protection encompasses not only freedom of speech, but also other
forms of expression, including freedom of implied speech and the
1
freedom to make political contributions. It ensures that speechrelated regulations are seldom allowed, and when they are, that they
2
must be minimally restrictive. The First Amendment thus balances
individual and state interests—and weighs that balance heavily in
favor of individual rights.
3
Knox v. Service Employees International Union presents the
question of what procedure is constitutionally required to protect
First Amendment interests when a union decides to implement a

*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law.
1. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977).
2. Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 181 (1956), aff’d, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)
(stating that restrictions on speech “must find justification in some overriding public interest,
and that restricting legislation must be narrowly drawn to meet an evil which the state has a
substantial interest in correcting”).
3. Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2012).
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midyear temporary assessment—especially when it intends to use the
4
proceeds for political purposes. In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No.
5
1 v. Hudson, the Supreme Court laid out the procedures that publicsector labor unions are constitutionally required to follow when
collecting annual service fees from employees who are not members
6
of the union—“nonmembers.” Before collecting these fees, unions
must now issue a Hudson notice containing certain information about
7
the amount and purpose of the fees.
In Knox, the Supreme Court must decide how to balance First
Amendment and union interests in light of the procedures already
required under Hudson. The Court will clarify what procedures
unions must follow when raising additional funds mid-year, especially
if those funds are to be used for ideological expenditures.
Additionally, the outcome of Knox may have the practical effect of
eliminating the ability of public-sector unions to finance their political
activities through midyear assessments. This commentary will discuss
the facts of Knox, the legal doctrines involved, the lower courts’
decisions, and the likely outcome in the Supreme Court. The
8
discussion will focus on public-sector unions.
II. FACTS
The State of California recognizes the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) as the exclusive bargaining agent for
9
state employees. California and the SEIU have entered into several
Memoranda of Understanding establishing the terms and conditions
10
of employment for the Petitioners and other state employees. One
such condition is that all state employees in specified bargaining
units—which include the Knox Petitioners—must either join the
SEIU as formal members or have agency fees deducted from their
11
pay.
4. Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S.
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121).
5. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
6. Id. at 310.
7. Id. at 306.
8. This article does not address labor unions representing only private-sector employees.
The word “union” will refer to public-sector unions only.
9. Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011)
(No. 10-1121).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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The SEIU determines how much it will charge nonmembers in
12
agency fees by using a calculation called the “prior-year method.”
The SEIU first analyzes its audited expenditures from the prior year
13
and determines whether they are “chargeable” or “nonchargeable.”
Chargeable expenses are those reasonably made to fulfill the union’s
duties as the exclusive bargaining representative, and nonmembers
14
must contribute to those expenses. Conversely, nonmembers cannot
be required to pay nonchargeable expenses, including expenditures
15
made in support of ideological or political activities.
Once the categories of expenditures are determined, the SEIU
16
determines the amount that it will charge nonmembers. The SEIU
may initially charge nonmembers for any expenditures it made the
17
previous year, chargeable or not. If a nonmember subsequently
objects to paying nonchargeable expenses, however, the SEIU must
charge that individual a “reduced fair share fee” made up of only
18
chargeable expenses.
Every June, the SEIU issues a Hudson notice, which “is meant to
provide nonmembers with, inter alia, an adequate explanation for the
19
basis of the agency fee.” Within thirty days, nonmembers can object
to paying the full dues and can instead elect to pay the reduced fair
20
share fee for that year. They may also object to the SEIU’s
21
calculation of chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. These
22
challenges are resolved by an “impartial decisionmaker.”
In June of 2005, the SEIU issued its annual Hudson notice,
wherein the agency fee to be deducted from nonmember employees’

12. Id. at *8.
13. Id.
14. Foster v. Mahdesian, 268 F.3d 689, 692 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the prior-year
method of calculation).
15. Id.
16. See Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom.
Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27,
2011) (No. 10-1121). The SEIU initially set nonmember fees at 99.1% of union dues. This
number does not correlate with any identifiable measure of fees and appears to be a unilateral
determination by the Union.
17. See id. (“The 56.35% was based on the Union’s actual expenditures for the year ending
December 31, 2004, in which the Union calculated chargeable expenditures to be 56.35% of its
total expenditures.”).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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paychecks was set at 99.1% of member dues. If a member objected
to paying this rate, he or she paid the fair share fee of 56.35% of
24
member dues. The notice did not say that an additional temporary
25
assessment would be included in that year’s dues and fees. The only
indication that such an assessment could arise was a clause that said:
26
“Dues are subject to change without further notice to fee payers.”
On July 30, 2005, the SEIU proposed an “Emergency Temporary
Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund” to be “use[d] for a
broad range of political expenses,” rather than for regular union
27
expenses. In August, SEIU delegates implemented the temporary
28
dues increase of 0.25% of salary. Nonmembers who had objected to
the original Hudson notice were charged a percentage of the increase
29
equal to the percentage of dues they were already paying.
On August 31, the SEIU distributed a letter stating that “the $45
per month cap on . . . regular dues of 1% gross pay would continue in
effect, but would not apply to [the] additional .0025 temporary
30
increase.” This letter stated several reasons for the increase,
including “elect[ing] a governor and a legislature who support public
employees and the services they provide” and “defeat[ing]
Proposition 76 and Proposition 75,” propositions that the Union felt
31
would allow the governor to “attack [the SEIU’s] pension plan.”
Petitioner Dobrowolski called the SEIU’s office to object to the
32
temporary increase. The SEIU’s Area Manager told Dobrowolski
that even if he had objected to paying the full agency fee and was
currently paying the reduced fair share fee, there was nothing he
33
could do to avoid paying the temporary assessment. The Area
Manager said that they were “in the fight of [their] lives” and that the
assessment was necessary to fund the political expenditures that the
34
SEIU intended to make.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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Knox, Dobrowolski, and six others filed a claim against the SEIU
35
in the Eastern District of California. They claimed the SEIU’s 2005
Hudson notice was inadequate to cover the temporary assessment
because it “did not provide an adequate explanation of the basis of
36
the assessment.” The District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiffs on those grounds and required the SEIU to
37
issue a new Hudson notice. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the annual Hudson notice was adequate because it provided
38
nonmembers with enough information to decide whether to object.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Nonmember Payment of Union Dues
Under California statute, a public agency may enter into an
39
“agency shop” agreement with a union that has been recognized as
40
the exclusive bargaining unit for a particular class of employee. An
agency-shop agreement requires an employee to either join a union
41
or to pay the union a service fee.
As the officially recognized and exclusive bargaining
representative of a particular class of employee, a union is required to
42
bargain on behalf of all workers in that class, including nonmembers.
Thus, if a union were unable to collect funds from nonmembers to
finance its bargaining activities, members would have to finance the
entire cost of the union’s activities while nonmembers would receive
43
its benefits for free.
A union may require nonmembers to pay “chargeable” expenses,
which include the costs of negotiating and administering a collective-

35. Id. at *1.
36. Id. at *4.
37. Id. at *11.
38. Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S.
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121).
39. Otherwise known as a “union shop” agreement.
40. Cal. Gov. Code § 3502.5(a) (West 2011). The requirements for a union to become
officially recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit for a class of public employee are
unimportant for the purposes of this commentary.
41. Id.
42. See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294 (1986)
(referring to the Chicago Teachers Union as the “exclusive collective-bargaining
representative” of the 27,500 employees in the bargaining unit, only 95% of which were
members of the union).
43. Id.
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bargaining agreement, the costs of settling grievances and disputes,
and other expenses reasonably made to fulfill the union’s duties as the
44
exclusive bargaining representative. Nonmembers are not required,
however, to pay “nonchargeable” expenses, including expenditures
45
made in support of ideological or political activities.
The union may determine the amount that will be deducted from
nonmembers’ paychecks as a fair share fee, provided that this fee does
46
not exceed union dues. This fee may be comprised of both
47
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. Nonmembers must,
however, be given a chance to object to paying the full fee; any
objecting nonmember may be charged only a reduced fair share fee
48
comprised exclusively of chargeable expenses.
B. First Amendment Considerations
49

The First Amendment protects implied speech and the right to
50
make political contributions. Agency-shop agreements, absent
safeguards, create the potential for unions to trample nonmembers’
First Amendment rights by using nonmembers’ fees for political
51
purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. As the Court explained
52
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, an employee might have a
number of ideological objections to union activity: “One individual
might disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to
strike . . . while another might have economic or political objections to
53
unionism itself.” Allowing the union to forcibly collect dues from
these nonmembers would violate the nonmembers’ long-recognized

44. Foster v. Mahdesian, 268 F.3d 689, 692 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).
45. Id.
46. Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011)
(No. 10-1121).
47. See id. at *2 (describing a “reduced fair share fee” consisting of only chargeable
expenses).
48. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (explaining that activities
not germane to the SEIU’s duties as a collective-bargaining agent must be financed by members
and nonmembers who do not object to those expenditures).
49. Unlike spoken words or writing, implied speech is expression that is not explicit, but
can be inferred from the speaker’s actions. Id. at 233. For example, an individual may express
his or her opposition to a message by refusing to participate in demonstrations or refusing to
contribute to certain funds or causes. See id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 222.
52. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
53. Id.
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First Amendment right to make—or refuse to make—contributions
54
for political purposes.
In Abood, the Supreme Court held that compelling a nonmember
to finance political activities unrelated to collective bargaining
55
violates the First Amendment. A union may, however, collect fees
from nonmembers to finance union activities related to collective
56
bargaining.
Because Knox implicates First Amendment rights, the Court will
need to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. Although publicsector unions are non-governmental organizations, they are the
exclusive bargaining agents for state employees; their actions
therefore qualify as “government action” subject to First Amendment
57
review. When reviewing governmental action that abridges First
Amendment rights, the level of scrutiny a court must apply depends
on whether the government action is content-based or content58
neutral. If the government action distinguishes speech based on its
content, it is a content-based restriction and must be reviewed under
59
strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the government action must
serve a compelling government interest, and it must be the least
60
restrictive means of serving that interest. Laws that compel speech
61
are subject to the same strict scrutiny standard.
C. Hudson Notice
There are two competing interests at stake when a Hudson notice
is required—nonmembers’ First Amendment right to refuse to fund
ideological activities must be balanced against the union’s ability to
collect a fair share fee to fund collective bargaining. Nonmembers
cannot be allowed to free ride on a union’s bargaining efforts, but a
union cannot force nonmembers to contribute funds to union
activities that do not benefit them, including political activities

54. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 n.9 (1986).
55. Abood, 431 U.S. at 254.
56. See id. (“[C]ompelling an employee to finance any union activity that may be ‘related’
in some way to collective bargaining is permissible under the First Amendment.”).
57. Id. at 226.
58. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
59. Id. at 642–43.
60. Id. at 653.
61. Id. at 642. The standard of review applied to content-neutral regulations is not
discussed here because the SEIU action in question is content-based—the SEIU required
nonmembers to contribute to a political fund used to advocate a specific message.
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62

unrelated to collective bargaining. In Hudson, the Supreme Court
devised a procedural solution to balance these interests: before
collecting annual fees, a union must issue a notice, the requirements of
which protect nonmembers who object to paying the nonchargeable
63
portion of the union-determined fair share fee. Under Hudson, the
notice must include “an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee,
a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee
before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts
64
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.”
The purpose of explaining the basis for the agency fee is to
provide nonmembers with enough information to “identify the impact
65
on [their] rights and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.”
The Hudson opinion also mentions that “adequate disclosure surely
would include the major categories of expenses, as well as verification
66
by an independent auditor.”
The union must also provide nonmembers with “a reasonably
prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an
67
impartial decisionmaker.” Hudson does not provide any guidance as
to how much time may elapse between a nonmember’s objection and
the hearing date, but a period of five months was considered
68
reasonably prompt in one Minnesota case. By contrast, in Tavernor v.
69
Illinois Federation of Teachers, the Seventh Circuit held that a period
70
of one year was “far from prompt.” The Hudson Court did, however,
provide a small explanation of the “impartial decisionmaker”
requirement: a union may not exercise an unrestricted choice among
71
arbitrators on the state list.
Finally, during these procedures, the union must place any funds
72
reasonably in dispute into an escrow account. This requirement
ensures that the union is unable to use wrongfully collected funds as a

62. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991).
63. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 (1986).
64. Id. at 310.
65. Id. at 294.
66. Id. at 307 n.18. The agency need not go as far as providing an exhaustive itemized list
of all expenditures.
67. Id. at 310.
68. Kuehn v. American Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 435 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Minn.
App. 1989).
69. 226 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 848.
71. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 308.
72. Id. at 310.
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type of forced loan while resolution of the objection is pending. Such
procedures are necessary to maintain the balance between
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights and a union’s interest in
74
avoiding free riders.
IV. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling in Knox v.
75
Westly and remanded with orders to deny Petitioners’ motion for
76
summary judgment. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de
novo, the Ninth Circuit employed a balancing test to determine the
adequacy of the SEIU’s Hudson notice: they sought to “prevent
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who
object thereto without restricting the SEIU’s ability to require every
employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining
77
activities.” The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected strict scrutiny review
78
because it felt that it was bound by the standard set forth in Hudson.
Applying that balancing test, the Ninth Circuit decided that SEIU
met the Hudson requirements because its annual notice warned that
79
“[d]ues [were] subject to change without further notice.”
In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit assigned great weight to the fact
that unions are required to base the calculation of their fair share fees
80
on audited figures. Because expenditures from the prior year were
the most recent audited figures available, it would have been
impossible for the SEIU to use any other method or to precisely
81
calculate the chargeable expenses for the upcoming year. The
calculation in the June 2005 Hudson notice was therefore a
reasonable accommodation of nonmembers’ First Amendment rights
82
under the balancing test.

73. Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 294.
75. 2008 WL 850128, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox v. SEIU, 628
F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121).
76. Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S.
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121).
77. Id. at 1119–20 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1120.
80. Id. at 1121.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1121.
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Additionally, the court stated that the political nature of the
temporary assessment was irrelevant because the Petitioners brought
a procedural Hudson challenge rather than a challenge to the
83
chargeability of the assessment. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that
the following year’s audited figures would reflect the assessment’s
84
chargeability. The following year’s fair share fee, then, would be
discounted by the amount of nonchargeable expenses that were
85
included in the assessment. The Ninth Circuit also noted that
nonmembers who objected to the initial Hudson notice and were
paying a reduced fair share fee were not charged 100% of the
86
assessment, but a reduced percentage of 56.35%.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected as “unworkable” the District
Court’s holding that a union must issue a second Hudson notice
whenever it intends to drastically depart from its typical spending
87
regime. The prior-year method, the court said, assumes that a union
has no typical spending regime because expenditures vary from year
88
to year and are accounted for in the following year’s fees. The Ninth
Circuit therefore rejected the District Court’s framework because it
would require a procedural scheme that places the least burden on
fee-payers rather than merely reasonably accommodating their First
89
Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: first, whether
a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may
condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment
intended for political expenditures without the union first providing a
Hudson notice and an opportunity for nonmembers to object; and
second, whether political expenditures for ballot measures are
90
chargeable to nonmembers. On October 3, 2011, the SEIU filed a
91
motion to dismiss the case as moot. The Supreme Court deferred its
92
decision on mootness until it heard oral argument on the merits.
83. Id. at 1122 n.4.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1122.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1123.
90. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2011).
91. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2011).
92. Knox v. SEIU Proceedings and Orders, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (Last visited Mar. 23,
2012) http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1121.htm.
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V. ARGUMENTS
The parties present arguments regarding two issues: the Hudson
requirements for temporary assessments and the chargeability of the
93
SEIU’s midyear assessment. Petitioners argue that a union must
94
issue a new Hudson notice in the event of a temporary assessment,
while Respondent argues that a separate notice is not required if the
original notice warned nonmembers that fees were subject to
95
increase. Petitioners contend that even if the SEIU’s procedures
were adequate, the temporary assessment was nonchargeable because
96
the expenses were unrelated to collective bargaining. Respondents
argue that while the assessment was used for political expenses, those
expenses were nonetheless related to collective bargaining because
the particular ideological causes on which they were spent implicated
97
the stability of collective-bargaining agreements.
A. Hudson Requirements for Midyear Temporary Assessments
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is inconsistent
with both Hudson and the strict scrutiny standard of review applied
98
to compelled speech in other contexts. Petitioners begin by arguing
that strict scrutiny applies in this case and that the SEIU’s actions did
not satisfy this exacting standard. First, in Boy Scouts of America v.
99
Dale, the Court established the principle that First Amendment
rights may only be abridged by regulations that are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests and that are unrelated to the
100
suppression of ideas. Second, Petitioners assert that strict scrutiny
applies to the procedures surrounding the collection of union dues
because unionism is a type of “compelled expressive association”
101
subject to First Amendment strict scrutiny review. Therefore,
“government-compelled association with a union agent is subject to
the most exacting levels of constitutional scrutiny,” and the Ninth

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 90, at i.
Brief for Petitioners at 19, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2011).
Brief for Respondent at 31, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2011).
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 24.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 49–50.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 10.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 648.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 15.
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102

Circuit was wrong to have applied a balancing test. The “selfevident” reason for applying strict scrutiny in cases of compelled
political speech—that such compelled speech corrupts the democratic
process—requires that strict scrutiny be applied in this case because
103
the assessment was used for political expenses.
Petitioners then argue that temporary assessments are not exempt
from Hudson requirements, and the SEIU’s actions thus do not pass
104
strict scrutiny. When a union imposes any new financial obligation
on employees, it must comply with Hudson requirements because to
do otherwise would strip the employees of their First Amendment
right to avoid the risk that their money will be used, even temporarily,
105
for activities unrelated to collective bargaining.
This risk is especially acute with regard to nonmembers who did
not object to paying the normal agency fee, but who would have if
they had known the SEIU was going to issue a temporary assessment
106
for political purposes. They argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding
required nonmembers opposed to the temporary assessment to have
objected to the original Hudson notice—a month in advance of when
the assessment was even proposed—based only on the SEIU’s
statement that “[d]ues are subject to change without further notice to
107
fee payers.” That statement did not provide sufficient information
for nonmembers to gauge whether to object to the temporary
increase and was thus inconsistent with Hudson and strict scrutiny
review.
2. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent claims that the Petitioners’ argument for strict
108
scrutiny ignores concerns of practicality and administrability.
According to Respondent, Petitioners’ concerns are not about
substantive First Amendment rights, but rather procedural rights,
109
which merit only a balancing analysis. Hudson’s balancing test
attempts to avoid “compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by

102.
103.
104.
105.
(1986)).
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20 (citing Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305
Id. at 21.
Id.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 31.
Id.
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employees who object thereto without restricting the SEIU’s ability
to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective
110
bargaining.” The Petitioners’ invocation of the right of expressive
association is misplaced, Respondent argues, because Petitioners rely
solely on cases in which compelled association interfered with a
111
group’s right to express its message. By contrast, Petitioners are
individuals who do not comprise an expressive association, and their
affiliation with the SEIU does not interfere with the expression of any
112
particular message.
Petitioners’ compelled-speech argument is
similarly misplaced because “[a] compelled speech violation occurs
only where ‘the complaining speaker’s own message [is] affected by
113
the speech it [is] forced to accommodate.’” Finally, Respondent
argues that strict scrutiny does not apply in this case because “a
statute permitting fair share fee payments to [a] bargaining
114
representative . . . has never triggered strict scrutiny.”
Respondent then asserts that the SEIU complied with the
requirements in Hudson and that any further procedural
requirements would cripple the SEIU’s ability to collect fair share
115
fees. Hudson’s prior-year calculation requires only that the SEIU
calculate its fees using expenditures verified by an independent
auditor and an accurate prediction of the upcoming year’s
116
expenditures is not expected. Respondent asserts that the Hudson
procedures were followed “to the letter” because the original notice
117
contained a warning that dues were subject to increase.
Furthermore, because objectors to the original notice were charged a
reduced percentage, the temporary increase did not require objectors
118
to subsidize the SEIU’s nonchargeable expenses.
Finally, Respondent argues that it is irrelevant that some nonobjectors might have objected had they known about the temporary
119
increase. Potential objectors had access to the original Hudson
notice, which clearly stated that a significant portion of dues was to be
110.
111.
112.
113.
(2006)).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 32 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302).
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63
Id. at 38.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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120

spent on nonchargeable political expenditures.
And because
Hudson does not require advance notice of specific expenditures,
notice of significant nonchargeable political expenditures, along with
notice of the potential for a midyear increase, was sufficient for
121
employees to decide whether to object. In other words, employees
who did not object to the original notice have missed their chance
because Hudson procedures are meant to shield only “nonmembers
who are opposed to ‘ideological expenditures of any sort that are
122
unrelated to collective bargaining.’”
B. Chargeability of Political Expenditures for Ballot Measures
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners also argue that compelling employees to pay a
temporary assessment to fund nonchargeable expenses violated their
123
First Amendment rights. Petitioners assert that chargeable union
expenditures must not only be germane to collective bargaining, but
124
The germaneness standard,
must also satisfy strict scrutiny.
according to Petitioners, merely serves a gatekeeping function in a
court’s analysis of whether a particular union expenditure is
chargeable—it does not substitute for a strict scrutiny analysis of that
125
expenditure. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the
expenditures were chargeable on the sole basis that they were
126
germane to the SEIU’s collective-bargaining duties.
Petitioners challenge the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that the
127
expenditures made to defeat Proposition 76 were chargeable. They
argue that these expenditures were not germane to the SEIU’s
collective bargaining duties because the only reference to collective
bargaining in Proposition 76 “addressed the way that the general

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 18 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 235, 241 (1977)). Here,
Respondent seems to be interpreting the phrase “any sort” to mean that Hudson procedures are
meant to protect nonmembers who are opposed to the SEIU spending money on ideological
activities at all, and that the protection does not extend to content-based objections. However,
this language is ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean that nonmembers may object to
any individual ideological expenditures that are unrelated to collective bargaining.
123. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 24.
124. Id. at 25–26 (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991)).
125. Id. at 27.
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 35.
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revenue stream for the entire State government might be altered” and
“placed no particular collective bargaining agreement . . . in specific
128
jeopardy of abrogation” by the Governor. And, even if Proposition
76 had a relationship to the SEIU’s collective-bargaining duties, these
expenses would still be nonchargeable; compelling employees to pay
these expenses would constitute an egregious infringement of their
First Amendment rights because the expenses were related to
129
political speech.
2. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent counters that Petitioners do not properly present
their claims as to the chargeability of the expenditures. First,
Respondent argues that Petitioners’ claim is strictly a procedural
challenge and not a substantive challenge to the spending of the fees
130
in question. Respondent bases this argument on the fact that “the
text of Proposition 76 and its legislative history are not contained
131
anywhere in the record of [the] case.” The Ninth Circuit did not
hold that the expenses were chargeable, Respondent argues, but
rather mentioned in passing that they might be chargeable and that
132
the question was not properly litigated.
Second, Respondent argues that even if the Court were to reach
133
the chargeability claim, it should reject it on the merits. The
expenses used to defeat Proposition 76 were germane to the SEIU’s
collective-bargaining duties because Proposition 76 “would have
effectively permitted the Governor to abrogate the SEIU’s collective134
bargaining agreements under certain circumstances.” The SEIU
further argues that the expenditures pass strict scrutiny because the
defeat of Proposition 76 was necessary to avoid the government
cutting employees’ bargained-for wages and benefits. Also, the
opposition to Proposition 76 did not significantly burden any First
Amendment rights because disagreements with the SEIU’s strategy
are inherent in agency-shop arrangements; Petitioners may not refuse
135
to pay simply because they disagree with the SEIU’s strategy.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 53.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court is faced with a loophole left by Hudson’s
incomplete coverage of union financing methods. Barring a finding of
mootness, the Court is likely to use this case to close that gap by
reversing the Ninth Circuit. To do otherwise would allow unions,
which are meant to protect employees from the superior bargaining
power of employers, to take advantage of those very same employees
to finance union leaders’ political agendas. Reversing the Ninth
Circuit would be consistent with the text and purpose of Hudson as
well as the strict scrutiny standard of review used in other areas of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court will first have to address the Ninth Circuit’s
reliance on the balancing test. The Ninth Circuit did not employ strict
scrutiny review because it interpreted Hudson to require a balance
between nonmembers’ First Amendment rights and unions’ ability to
136
collect fair share fees. The Court could find two flaws in the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit improperly weighed these
interests equally; the SEIU’s ability to collect its fair share fees was
subject to only a reasonable accommodation of nonmembers’ First
137
Amendment rights. These interests, though, are not equal in
importance. Nonmembers’ First Amendment rights must outweigh
the SEIU’s interests because a union does not have a constitutional
right to collect fees from nonmembers for expenses other than those
138
associated with collective bargaining.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Hudson ignores that
case’s facts and text, which indicate that the Hudson requirements are
an acceptable way to satisfy strict scrutiny rather than a substitute for
that standard. Strict scrutiny review is, after all, a balancing of
government and First Amendment interests; the framework merely
makes sure that courts weigh individual First Amendment interests
more heavily than the government’s interest.
The union action at issue in Hudson, like the action at issue here,
would have triggered a strict scrutiny analysis based on the fact that it

136. Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061
(U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121).
137. See id. at 1120 (employing a “reasonable accommodation” test as articulated in
Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1993)).
138. See Chicago Teacher’s Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1986)
(explaining that nonunion employees have an interest in having their fees used principally for
collective-bargaining purposes).
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139

involved compelled political contributions. The Hudson Court did
not fashion an entirely new standard of review for First Amendment
140
actions simply because it was dealing with union dues. The Ninth
Circuit ignored language requiring fee collection procedures to be
“carefully tailored to minimize” infringement of nonmembers’ First
141
Amendment rights. Admittedly, Hudson did not explicitly employ
the usual strict scrutiny formulation. However, footnote eleven in
Hudson demonstrates that the Court did, in fact, apply a strict
142
143
scrutiny analysis. The Court cited Roberts v. United States Jaycees
for the proposition that “infringements on freedom of association
‘may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
144
145
freedoms.’” Footnote eleven also references Elrod v. Burns, which
held that government means must be “least restrictive of freedom of
146
belief and association.” The Hudson Court’s reliance on these cases
indicates that Hudson, rather than creating a new balancing test,
merely articulates procedural requirements that satisfy a strict
scrutiny standard of review.
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling is also inconsistent with the purpose of
Hudson: to allow non-union employees “a fair opportunity to identify
the impact of the governmental action on [their] interests and to
147
assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.” Here, the SEIU’s
Hudson notice mentioned only that fees were subject to increase; it

139. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that regulations
compelling an individual or entity to speak in order to avoid the appearance of agreement with
the expressed message trigger strict scrutiny). Here, objecting nonmembers could very well feel
compelled to express their individual views on Proposition 76 in order to avoid appearing like
they agree with the SEIU’s view. Respondent argues that compelled speech violations only
occur when the objector’s own message is affected, but this is unpersuasive—by forcing
nonmembers to contribute funds to ideological causes they disagree with, the expression of their
personal beliefs is inherently affected as those funds are no longer available for them to spend
on their own personal expression.
140. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 (“[T]he fact that those rights are protected by the First
Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement.”
(emphasis added)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 303 n.11.
143. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
144. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 n.11 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
145. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
146. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 n.11 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363 (1976)).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
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148

did not say for what purposes or by how much. The SEIU then
hastily put together its “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a
Political Fight-Back Fund,” which it has conceded was not meant for
149
regular union expenditures. Through this misleading course of
action, the SEIU was able to collect funds for nonchargeable
expenses from nonmembers who did not have enough information to
object to the original Hudson notice. It can hardly be said that such
incomplete information afforded the nonmembers a fair chance to
object.
The Ninth Circuit dismissed as unworkable the District Court’s
requirement of a second Hudson notice upon “drastic departure”
from a union’s typical spending regime. But it would not be
unreasonable to require a union to issue a second Hudson notice
when the union has new information about its spending regime to
which nonmembers might reasonably object. By their very nature,
temporary assessments are issued because the originally collected
dues are inadequate to cover specific union expenses. When issuing a
temporary assessment, the union will have information about what it
wants to spend money on and how much money the temporary
increase will raise—information withheld from the employees in the
original Hudson notice. Further, the prior-year method is meant to
150
substitute for the precise calculation of the upcoming figures. In this
case, that information is actually available, so Respondent does not
need to rely on the prior-year method. Hudson does not require a
union to predict the upcoming year’s finances with 100% accuracy,
but it does require that the union divulge information it has about
151
upcoming expenditures. It is not fair for the union to use this
information disparity to bulldoze nonmembers’ First Amendment
rights and force them to finance activities to which they object.

148. Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011)
(No. 10-1121).
149. Id.
150. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18 (“[T]here are practical reasons why absolute
precision in the calculation of the charge to nonmembers cannot be expected or required. Thus,
for instance, the Union cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of its expenses
during the preceding year.”).
151. See id. at 306 (“Since the unions possess the facts and records from which the
proportion of political to total union expenditures may reasonably be calculated, basic
considerations of fairness compel that they . . . bear the burden of proving such proportion.”
(quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 239–40 n.40 (1977))).

MARCANTONIO FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/6/2012 9:34 AM

KNOX V. SEIU: BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH FAIRNESS

229

In addition, the fairness principle may indicate that the Hudson
requirements are actually altogether inapplicable in the case of
temporary assessments. The SEIU justifies its actions by noting that
152
Hudson requires it to base its notices on audited figures. But it does
not follow that once a union issues its annual Hudson notice based on
those audited figures, it is fair for the union to increase fees mid-year
for political purposes simply because those figures will not be audited
until the following year. Because of this inconsistency, the Supreme
Court may be justified in finding that Hudson does not even address
temporary assessments.
If the Court finds Hudson does not properly address temporary
fee increases, it likely will apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Under this
standard, the SEIU’s actions are clearly unconstitutional. Under Ellis
153
v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks, a union
cannot constitutionally collect from dissenting nonmembers money
that will be used in support of ideological causes not germane to its
154
collective-bargaining duties. Although Respondent argues that the
155
chargeability of the increase is not properly presented, in the event
that the Court determines that Hudson does not address temporary
assessments, chargeability will be a crucial element in deciding
whether the SEIU’s actions survive a traditional strict scrutiny
analysis. If the Court determines that the expenses are nonchargeable,
then it was unconstitutional for the SEIU to collect them in the first
156
place, regardless of the procedures they used to do so.
In addition, there are compelling practical reasons why the
Supreme Court should rule in favor of the Petitioners. If the Court
rules for Respondent, unions will only be required to issue Hudson
notices that include a simple warning to nonmembers that “dues are
subject to increase.” A union could then obtain forced loans from
nonmembers by issuing temporary assessments despite the fact that
the union intends to use the increase on nonchargeable expenses. This
loophole neutralizes nonmembers’ constitutional right to avoid the
risk that their money will be used, even temporarily, for political
purposes to which they are opposed.

152. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 12.
153. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
154. Id. at 447.
155. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 43.
156. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447 (stating that unions cannot constitutionally collect any money
for the support of ideological causes unrelated to their collective-bargaining duties).
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Finally, allowing unions to raise political funds through midyear
assessments could have negative effects on the function of agencyshop agreements. Members and nonmembers alike will begin to
mistrust unions that take advantage of this loophole. Nonmembers
will be forced to object to every single Hudson notice they receive
because of the risk that the union will issue a temporary assessment.
These objections will increase administrative costs for unions and
decrease the funds that are available for any purpose. The effects may
cut into unions’ ability to perform their collective-bargaining
functions. In its most extreme form, this mistrust may result in public
employees choosing to decertify their unions, leaving them at the
mercy of the superior bargaining power of their employers.
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court will most likely rule in favor of the Petitioners
in order to avoid the practical consequences of allowing unions to
raise political funds by issuing midyear assessments without notice. In
particular, the court will likely try to prevent the massive proceedings
associated with the increased number of objections such a loophole
would necessitate. In addition, a ruling for the Petitioners is the only
outcome that would be consistent with Hudson, First Amendment
jurisprudence, and the Constitution.

